For several decades we, among others, have criticized the use of citations for evaluative purposes. Although these criticisms have been noted, they have been largely brushed aside or ignored, not addressed head on. This may be for a number of reasons, but we believe the main one is that these criticisms undermine the desire to have an easy "scientific"-that is, quantitative-method of evaluation. Consequently, we continue and update our criticism of the use of citations for evaluation.
Introduction
The first thing one notes about the scientific paper is that it does not reflect what scientists actually do but is a sanitized and reconstructed version of that activity. This point was made half a century ago by Nobel Laureate Peter Medawar (1963) who described the scientific paper as a "fraud," meaning that "it misrepresents the process of thought that . . . gave rise to the work. . ." (p. 377). The scientific paper embodies "a totally mistaken conception, even a travesty, of the nature of scientific thought."
In short, as Mitroff (1974) writes, "You can't understand science in terms of the simple-minded articles that appear in the journals" (p. 589).
These general observations subsequently have been confirmed by many others who have studied how scientists conduct research and write papers. Scientific papers are not diaries or direct transcriptions of what transpired at the lab bench. If scientific papers are not a transcription of what scientists actually do, then the question becomes: Do the references tagged on to them reflect the influences?
Informal Communication
One of the major findings of those who have closely investigated science as it is being done at the lab bench is that informal communication (e.g., shop talk, conversations at conferences, weekly laboratory meetings, scientific gossip, e-mail) is immensely important (Bartusiak, 2009; Sismondo, 2004 ; see also Sawyer, 2006, and references) . But scientists acknowledge very few, if any, of these influences in their papers, a point made by Bernal (1939, pp. 119, 303) long before sociologists began studying scientific communication. Informal influence may be credited in an "acknowledgment" or in the text but is not captured in the references (see Dawkins, 2008 , for an excellent example). Edge (1979) likens scientific communication to an iceberg: only the tip of the iceberg is visible as citations to published work; the baseinformal communication and tacit knowledge-is invisible below the waterline. As Daniel Kevles (quoted by Dizikes, 2006) says: "What's happened in the last 15 to 20 years is that we've learned how even the very greatest scientists . . . were always engaged in collaboration of a very important, fundamental nature with their contemporaries" (p. 2). Take Darwin. Many scholars have emphasized that although Darwin was a recluse, he was not only a voracious reader of the scientific literature but maintained a massive worldwide correspondence with explorers, naturalists, and researchers (Burkhardt, 1985 (Burkhardt, -2014 . Among this correspondence, Darwin received a manuscript from the Malay Archipelago entitled "On the tendency of varieties to depart indefinitely from the original type," which finally prodded him into publishing On the Origin of Species the following year.
No one who has read J.D. Watson's (1968) personal account of the discovery of the structure of DNA can ever accept that the six references listed at the end of the famous Watson and Crick 1953 paper in Nature reflect the influence on their discovery. Not only did they have information "of a whole generation of geneticists, biochemists, microbiologists and crystallographers . . . but the advice and assistance of many other able scientific colleagues and contemporaries" (Ziman, 1976, p. 83) . It is also clear from all accounts that, by 1952, it was the informal level of communication that was important. It was what the scientists were doing on the moving edge of research/speculation that was important to Watson and Crick, and they made every effort to get that information. Clearly, the Watson and Crick paper, similar to all scientific papers, is a "misrepresentation" of what scientists actually do (Howitt & Wilson, 2014) . Heisenberg (1971) makes this point absolutely clear when he says: "Science rests on experiments; its results are attained through talks among those who work in it and who consult one another about their interpretation of these experiments. . ." (p. xvii). As Heisenberg insists: "Science is rooted in conversations" (quoted by Sawyer, 2006, p. 276, italics added) .
One further point regarding informal communication. Studies by Dunbar (2000) of laboratory meetings show that ideas are generally communal efforts and that months later participants have already forgotten where the ideas came from. Interestingly, as Sawyer (2006) adds, it is "usually the chief scientist who gets credit for these collaborative results" (p. 277).
Formal Communication
Turning from the informal to the formal level of scientific communication-publications-what one is struck by regarding citation analysis is the fact that virtually none of the hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who have used citations as data over the past four decades has tested (or even seriously questioned) the central assumption of citation analysis-that scientists cite their influences (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1989 , 1996 . However, in the very few cases where this assumption has been tested it has been found that scientists do not cite all or even most of their influences. For example, we read papers in several fields and found that authors cite only between 5% and 30% of their influences (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1986 , 1996 . Worse yet, according to Buschman and Michalek (2013) , in a more recent survey using many data sources, "citation counts only represent a small fraction of how a paper is used; in fact, citation counts represent less than 1% of usage of an article" (p. 35). In addition, what is cited is a highly biased sample of what is used. Some publications are cited every time they are used, some are never or seldom cited even though they are used just as often as the cited works, and secondary sources are often cited in preference to primary sources (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 1986 , 1987 , 1989 , 1996 . One reason for this is relatively simple; as Leimu and Koricheva (2005) point out, "the abundance of available literature and journal space limitations prevent authors from citing all the used sources, resulting in only a small proportion of the literature base of a scientific paper being cited" (p. 28; see also Rafferty, Wong, and Chapple, 2015; Seglen, 1992, p. 635 ). In addition, some journals such as Trends in Ecology and Evolution permit only 12 references for a short article.
But the problem goes much further. Contrary to the view that a failure to cite is random and thus evens out in large samples (Cronin, 2005a) , what actually happens is that scientists cite a highly biased, field-related fraction of their influences (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 2010) . For example, biogeographers who write theoretical papers (which are usually published in "top" journals) cite other theoretical papers (which are also usually published in "top" journals) but rarely cite data (primary source) papers (which are usually not published in "top" journals) although their theoretical work depends on data papers: sine qua non (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 2010) . Very simple examples of this are easily found. Here are the main data sources for three theoretical papers from Nature and Science: "We thank the huge number of amateur lepidopterists throughout Europe who have collected most of the data" (Parmesan et al., 1999, p. 583) ; "We thank the thousands of recorders who contributed to the building of EcoPlant and Sophy databases" (Lenoir, Gegout, Marquet, de Ruffray, & Brisse, 2008 , p. 1771 ; "We are particularly grateful to the many thousands of volunteers responsible for collecting most of the records of species" (Chen, Hill, Ohlemuller, et al., 2011 , p. 1026 . But none of these thousands of individuals is cited in these papers, which is precisely the case for "online supplementary material (OSM)" (Rafferty et al., 2015) .
Such field-related referencing bias was noted years ago by McGervey (1974) , who states "Consider a 1968 paper by Gell-Mann, Oaks and Renner. . .. It cited 26 papers; all were by theorists. A check of the cited papers shows that almost all of the papers cited in them were also by theorists. The only references to experimental work were 'second generation' citations of books and review articles" (p. 30).
Taxonomists are also highly critical of the use of citations for evaluative purposes (Croft, 2010; Krell, 2009; Valdescasas, 2011) . The problem is that although taxonomy is basic to biology, taxonomists are seldom cited although their work "underpins . . . diverse areas of biological inquiry" (Calver, 2015, p. 2) . Further, taxonomic citing is done in ways that simply elude the citation indexers (Croft, 2010) .
Another form of biased citing has been described by Szava-Kovats (2002) as "indirect-collective" citing, whereby the author makes reference to all references cited in a directly cited publication. Szava-Kovats (2002) B47, 409 (1996) and references therein" (p. 47). The "and references therein" indicates that it is not just the paper by McCallum and Shigemutsu that is being cited but also at least some of the references in that paper. According to Szava-Kovats (2002, p. 48) , the explanation for this type of referencing is the same as that made by Leimu and Koricheva (2005) quoted earlier. But the point for our purpose is that indirect-collective references "exceed many times over the quantity of references taken into account by the ISI as 'citations'" (Szava-Kovats, 2002, p. 54) . Thus, many influences are cited indirectly but are not visible to the reader or indexer.
Scientists also do not cite "obliterated" work (Dewey, 2016; McCain, 2014) . Such work is sometimes mentioned in the text (often eponymously) but is not cited in the references. For example, Goudsmit (1974) writes: "Every physicist knows that in his research he uses a multitude of contributions made by others, some important, many minor but nevertheless essential. Only a few of these are cited; others are taken for granted" (p. 24).
This important point is also made by Medawar (1979) : "Everything that a scientist does is a function of what others have done before him: the past is embodied in every new conception and even in the possibility of its being conceived at all" (p. 30).
Another type of obliteration is what might be called "immediate obliteration," whereby the information in a paper is immediately absorbed into large databases without being cited or acknowledged in any manner. In biology, for example, the information in many plant and animal distribution papers, notably those giving species range extensions, is instantly and without citation incorporated into large plant and animal distribution databases or atlases, as in Kartesz's Floristic Synthesis of North America (BONAP), Nature-Serve, and USDA, NRCS Plants. It is these databases that are cited rather than the individual papers or reports (see MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 2010) .
There are many other problems with the use of citations for evaluative purposes. For example, scientists show language, gender, and nationality biases in citing, which is also true of major databases (Harzing & van der Wal 2008; Sugimoto, 2013) . Scientists often copy from secondary sources and cite reviews, not primary sources, and often not the most relevant source (Calver, 2014; Dewey, 2016) . Scientists frequently "lift" citations without consulting them. This practice often results in an author being cited for an opinion contrary to his own, as occurred when Cole and Cole (1972) misunderstood, misrepresented, and misquoted Ortega y Gasset and later authors following the Coles accepted their misinterpretation as being Ortega's ideas (Szava-Kovats, 2004) . Apparently, scientists when reading the literature are spotty or read only abstracts and conclusions. In fact, the original may never be consulted (Calver, 2013 (Calver, , 2014 Natt, 2013) . A large proportion of citations either do not clearly support the statement made, are trivial, or are ambiguous (Dewey, 2016) . Scientists often show referencing bias for works that support their findings or interests ("confirmatory bias") and ignore, but are familiar with and do not cite, works that do not support their views (Aviv, 2014) . "Clerical errors" and problems with homonyms, notably in databases, are abundant and are repeated over and over by copyists Franceschini, Maisano, & Mastrogiacomo, 2016) . Modern scientists seldom cite negatively but instead obfuscate or ignore those they disagree with (Athar & Teufel, 2012) . The failure to cite competitors or even immediate predecessors is so common in modern highly competitive science that illustrating it is pointless (Horrobin, 1990; Kragh, 1987, p. 192) . Multiauthored papers-many running to 25, 50, 100, or more authors-present problems in determining who should receive credit and how much (Moustafa, 2016) . Also there are "honorary" or "guest" and "ghost" authors whose names are added as coauthors but who are largely strangers to the paper (Albert & Wager 2003; Martin, 1992) . Different fields have different citing practices: mathematicians cite far fewer papers than do biologists (Radicchi & Castellano, 2012) , and even the various mathematics subdisciplines have different citation rates (Smolinsky & Lercher, 2012) . And, of course, there is the problem of self-citing mentioned by virtually everyone. A more recently recognized problem, which directly stems from the use of citations as quality indicators, is what Wilhite and Fong (2012, p. 542) call "coercive citing," whereby editors "target authors and papers into citing the editors' journals."
The assumption "that scientists cite the work that they have found useful in pursuing their own research" (Neuhaus & Daniel, 2008, p. 175) or that "the most important papers are cited with greater probability . . . than the less important papers" (Bornmann, Schier, Marx, & Daniel, 2012, p. 11 ) is not only false but begs the question. Which is more important or useful: the data and experimental papers upon which theoretical papers are based or the theoretical papers? Without the former, the latter would not exist. Without taxonomists, biology would collapse. A classic example of the need for both assiduous data collectors and those inclined toward explaining events is the case of Johannes Kepler who "enthusiastically became Tycho Brahe's assistant with the opportunity to luxuriate in the meticulous data which the master collected so diligently" (Kantor, 1969, p. 16) . Viewed this way, the "more important-less important" dichotomy is invalid. Both data collectors and data crunchers are important, and certainly the latter would not exist without the former.
The equation: cited 5 used, may be correct with many caveats, exceptions, corrections, and qualifications, but the equation: not cited 5 not used, is simply false. What those interested in the stratification of science have failed to test is the underlying assumption of citation analysis by studying scientists at work. They have even failed to undertake the simple task of reading papers to see if the influences are cited and how they are cited; in other words, they regard citations as unproblematic data and dismiss the possibility of "selection bias." The result, as Goudsmit (1974, p. 28) pointed out four decades ago, is a highly "distorted picture" of science. This is the trap that many others who have used citations as a proxy for impact have unwittingly fallen into.
As far as some critics are concerned, bibliometricians are guilty of one of the most elementary mistakes in science: they do not understand data collection and sampling. For example, one of the hallmarks of science is the testing of assumptions and hypotheses. Four decades ago, McGervey (1974) and Goudsmit (1974) pointed out that, although it was assumed that scientists cite their influences, this assumption had not been tested. Even recent publications that claim to be "comprehensive reviews" fail to mention that citations are a highly biased sample of influences and conclude that "article-level citation metrics . . . might be useful indicators of academic impact, as long as they are interpreted in the light of disciplinary norms and with due regard to their limitations" (Wilsdon, 2015 p . xx, italics added)! Understand this statement: To interpret citation counts, bibliometricians/grant managers must not only be facile with the subject in question, be it nonlinear optics, coherence theory, or phytogeography, but must also take all the problems-from self-citing to field-related biased citing-into account.
Databases
Turning to databases, as we have already pointed out, scientists supply the citations, and thus all the biases and problems inherent in citing will be passed on to the databases. Further, the popular Web of Science database was not designed for citation analysis, but rather as a source for locating papers on similar subjects by way of conventionally cited works. Thomson Reuters neither monitors all journals nor a random or stratified sample of them. Instead, it monitors only the so-called "top" journals. Nisonger (2004) and Krell (2009) found in their detailed studies of citations to their own work that Web of Science and other citation databases captured only a small fraction of them. We have undertaken similar studies and found the same thing.
Web of Science is also biased toward particular disciplines. Bibliometrics is well covered; taxonomy is not. It also favors English language and Western journals . Further, the strong financial interest involved in commercially developed databases should be a red flag for anyone thinking of using such data, just as it is in medical research when drug companies and big money can influence results (Macdonald & Kam, 2011) . Cronin (2005b) clearly suggests these data problems when he says that there are "reliability-related issues arising from . . . the selectivity and boundedness . . . of ISI's [Thomson Reuters] coverage. . ." (p. 181).
Other databases have been developed (e.g., Scopus), but these new resources have not only the same problems as Thomson Reuters but their own problems and biases as well Harzing & van der Wal 2008; Labbe, 2010; Rafferty et al. 2015) . As Harzing (2010) makes clear, "the output [of any database] is only as good as its input" (p. 1); in other words, the old "garbage in, garbage out" problem prevails .
In summary, an examination of the databases used to measure productivity and impact reveals that, without exception, they are pervasively flawed; they are incomplete and highly biased samples. However, attempts to correct the problems continues (Amancio, Nunes, Oliveira Jr, & da F. Costa, 2012; Colledge et al., 2010) .
Normalizing, Correcting, and Cleaning the Data But hope remains. Even the most ardent defender of evaluative bibliometrics has come to recognize at least some of the numerous problems with citation analysis and the databases upon which this measure rests. Therefore, supporters have attempted to eliminate or minimize these by using "normalizing," "cleaning," and "correcting" methods and by improving "standards of good practice for analyzing bibliographic data" (Bornmann, Mutz, Neuhaus, & Daniel, 2008, p. 93) . This "means that the very many pitfalls and sources of error . . . have to be known in detail and that all relevant corrections have to be made" (Van Raan, 2005, pp. 135 and 141) . This is a daunting task, considering the number of problems, their complexity, and the amount of disagreement over how these difficulties should be handled. Even solutions to the simplest and most longstanding problems, for example, how to define a paper, how to allocate credit for multiauthored papers, what to do with self-citations, how to define a "discipline," have been and continue to be endlessly debated (De Bellis, 2009 ; LSE Public Policy Group, 2014).
We will not enter these debates here given the plethora of problems and the fact that others are currently engaged in squabbling over how to address them (Cronin & Sugimoto, 2015) . Suffice it to say, there has been no attempt to correct uncited influences (whether formal or informal), fieldrelated citing biases, or for the fact that Thomson Reuters monitors only a small, nonrandom selection of journals, because, apparently, such problems are either not recognized, or if recognized, side-stepped because there would be no practical way to correct for them.
"Theory of Citing" and Citer Motivation
Heavy weather has been made of a "theory of citing," and after four decades of debate there is still no consensus on why scientists cite. Theories of citing range from the na€ ıve, idealized, Arcadian, Pollyanna image of scientists adhering to the "CUDOS" norms presented by Merton (Sismondo, 2004) to the all-out Machiavellian wars described by Latour (Luukkonen, 1997) . We deal with only the two main "theories" here, the normative-meritocratic and the constructivist.
From the very outset, proponents of the normativemeritocratic theory have concluded that "the weight of empirical evidence seems to suggest that scientists typically cite the works of their peers in a normatively guided manner" (Cronin, 2005a (Cronin, , p. 1508 , meaning that they "reward predecessors" and "give credit where credit is due"; whereas the constructivists have found that scientists do not cite primarily to reward or give credit but rather because citations are useful: they contextualize, persuade, convince, back up, supplement, reinforce, support knowledge claims, and display erudition, precisely what Goudsmit (1974) in his response to Cole and Cole (1972) concluded: "The reason for citing a paper is primarily for possible support of the author's contentions and only secondarily in recognition of previous work" (p. 28). Therefore, from the constructivist perspective the purpose of citing is not to give credit: such "credit" as is given is merely an inadvertent side effect of trying to convince the audience that the author is expert in the subject.
One misconception about the constructivists' view of science should never have arisen. Citation advocates such as Van Raan (1998) , in responding to what he thinks is the constructivist position, claims that "nobody can seriously maintain that the references . . . are totally unreasonable and completely arbitrary. . .. Valid patterns in citations will be detected if a sufficiently large number of papers are used for analysis. Furthermore, it is statistically very improbable that all researchers in a field share the same distinct reference biases" (p. 134-135). Cronin (2005a) erects the same straw man when he says: "A hundred million acts of whimsy? I trust not" (p. 1508). Of course, citing is not arbitrary, unreasonable, random, or whimsical, and nobody is claiming any such thing. Patterns of citing occur and are obvious. For example, contra Van Raan (1998, p. 134-135) , scientists in a field do share the same distinct reference-biases (MacRoberts & MacRoberts, 2010) . Citing is serious, cultural, structured, strategic, and formulaic. What is cited and where it is cited is crucial to the meaning and persuasiveness of the paper; citations are part of the rhetorical strategy; they are part "of the argument itself" (Ravetz quoted by Gilbert, 1977, p. 114) . Scientists learn to write in the "official style" of their discipline; they learn what the "right" sources are and how to cite "the right sources in the right places" (De Bellis, 2009, p. xix) . They put in the "correct" (that is, expected) references to show others that they know how to cite, what to cite, who to cite, and who not to cite. Citations, therefore, can be considered to be highly ritualized displays. The question is not why authors cite specific influences, but the reasons they do not cite other influences (Rafferty et al., 2015) .
Perhaps what is most interesting in this perduring debate is that, as we have repeatedly emphasized, it is the normative-meritocratic theory of citing that is plagued with anomalies and problems that must be explained away or corrected; whereas there is nothing to correct in the constructivist theory because it does not assume that the primary purpose of citing is to give credit or to list all or the most important influences and therefore need not explain why the scientific paper is so deficient in doing just that. This fact and this fact alone should bring into question the entire enterprise of using citations as evaluative data. After all, are not the many anomalies serious enough to suggest that perhaps the underlying assumption of the normativemeritocratic view has been "falsified," to use Karl Popper's term, and that a "paradigm shift," to use Thomas Kuhn's phrase, is in order? But, no matter. Either way, the vast majority of influence is not cited. Period.
Discussion
De Bellis (2009) summarizes our position perfectly: "It is the foundations of the building that the MacRobertses attack: citations cannot be trusted at all as proxies of intellectual influence, let alone scientific merits, their right of citizenship in the sociology of science being denied even before the border is crossed and any citation counting commences" (p. 264). In other words, we have thrown the "bibliometric baby out with the bathwater" (Cronin, 2005a (Cronin, , p. 1506 ) because the last thing science needs is for institutional administrators and granting agencies to believe that citation counts can be used to measure impact or quality (Lawrence, 2002 (Lawrence, , 2007 Sabaratnam & Kirby, 2014 )! Contrary to Cole and Cole (1972) , Bornmann, de Moya Angeon, and Leydesdorff, (2010) , Stokes (2010) , and many others, the work of the "average scientist" is used by the "outstanding scientist," and so-called "minor work" is necessary for the production of "major contributions."
Because "citation analysis is . . . a poor tool for studying communication and influence. . ." (Sismondo, 2004, p. 35) , why is it so desperately defended? Sosteric (1999, p. 19) provides the answer: "citation analysis is a perfect prop for supporting the status quo," what he calls the "great man myth" of science (Sosteric, 1999, p. 19) . Sosteric (1999) 
explains:
Clearly there are political implications to the use of citation analysis. From its statistical failings to its tendency to erase the contributions of women and minorities, citation analysis would seem to be a largely unreliable and invalid tool for assessing scholarly impact. You would think, given this, that most would gladly put the use of the measure to one side. This however appears hopeless fantasy. Even though proponents of citation analysis often recognize its profound limitations, they defend it. And the contortions and desperate clutches at respectability that have emerged can be both amusing and disturbing. . .. Citation analysis tends to support a particular one-sided, reified, and elitist view of scientific contributions that ignores . . . certain groups of scholars and by doing so justifies the highly stratified nature of the academy where certain groups are privileged over others. (p. 14) Sosteric (1999) 
continues:
Because citation analysis is completely insensitive to all but the most formal contributions to the academy, and even then it tends toward the conservative, it is biased and inadequate. Citation analysis does not fairly represent the entire range of contributions to the academy and hence using it as a way of measuring contribution will exacerbate already existing hierarchies and ensure that the vast pool of scientific workers never get credit for their contribution. (pp. 18-19) or the vast informal communication arena. Why would they, when the easily accessible data from the Science Citation Index and other similar databases "confirm" their view of science as a normatively guided, highly skewed meritocracy, with, naturally, themselves among the "elite."
But Sosteric has left one thing out. Macdonald and Kam (2011) complete the picture:
This article has looked at the skew in academic publishing. Skew may be natural, but there is nothing at all natural about its association with quality in academic publishing. That is the accomplishment of Machiavellian Man. Eugene Garfield was the first to use citation analysis to identify the skewed few. Had he not been able to convince others that skew denotes quality, or can be portrayed as denoting quality, the commercial prospects of citation analysis, and of ISI, would be limited. . .. Always this skew in academic publishing is presented in terms of quality coming to the fore. It is presented this way by the company providing the citation data, a company whose business model is dependent on this conclusion being reached . . .. And it is presented this way by the skewed few themselves, who are not at all averse to the idea that skew is determined by quality. The situation is accepted by a lay world uncomfortable with the unmeasurable and deeply suspicious of the professional, a managerial world that demands control over professional labour. Andlet us be frank-it is accepted by academics themselves, many of whom now have more capital in gaming skills than in scholarship. (p. 472) Macdonald and Kam are not alone in seeing the "quid pro quo" effect of the interaction between scientific and nonscientific power brokers. "From powerful non-scientists, scientists receive funding. . .. From powerful scientists, the non-scientists receive help in directing scientific research through channels selectively useful to the latter's interests" (Martin, 1981, p. 15) . As the old proverb has it, "he who pays the piper, calls the tune."
What we witness here is how blind ideologues can be; they simply dismiss-or ignore-data contradicting their beliefs, and their theories and opinions increasingly take precedence over the facts. The result, as Sosteric (1999) points out, is "the creation of a one-dimensional . . . intellectual edifice resistant to the development of critical discourse and critical pedagogy" (p. 3). Such "objective" scientific evaluation as given by citation counts pushes science in the direction of an Orwellian dystopia (Sosteric, 1999) by narrowing discourse and making it harder to dissent from orthodoxy and easier to justify the inequality of the academy. This is why it is imperative to study the scientist's ideology and wider cultural context to fully understand not only the citation analysis dispute but virtually all scientific disputes (Sismondo, 2004) . Scientists, including scientometricians and bibliometricians, are not persons of preternatural probity who view the world through "some impersonal ocular device" or "the spectacles of objectivity" (Locke, 1992, p. 57) but are products of history and society and are invariably strongly committed to particular theories or ideologies, including those about how science itself operates. Consequently, to paraphrase the historian E.H. Carr (1965, p. 26 and 54) , to understand the scientist's findings it is not enough to look at the "facts"; one must also look at scientists and the culture in which they live; that is, their presuppositions. This is as much the case for bibliometrics as it is for any other science, for there is no question that science developed and thrives in a highly stratified elitist society, and there is also no question that bibliometricians have embraced this highly stratified elitist view regarding science itself. The only question for our purposes is the following: Is science a "normatively guided meritocracy" in which "only a few scientists contribute to scientific progress"? Or is this characterization just part of the overarching background derived from the culture as a whole and not from actual events? Is this in fact a popular cultural or political "myth" promulgated by the minority "elite" to help keep their positions secure? Our answer, of course, is that it is. Remove the thin rhetorical veneer and see what actually lies beneath: a completely different world, a world in which the skewed few recede into the background and the majority take front center.
Consequently, if we really want to find out how science operates and who is standing on whose shoulders and not just rubber-stamp traditional myth, we must not only abandon traditional fabulist notions about science, scientists, publishing, discovery, stratification, citing, peer review, and especially scientific communication but also cease using simplistic methods and easily accessible convenience samples and instead develop sampling methods that are appropriate to the questions we want answered. We must cease trying to create a scientific aura by attempting to reduce complex field events into simple numbers that can then be treated as baseball batting averages (Lawrence, 2002 (Lawrence, , 2007 . In 1939 there was no "science of science" (Cole & Cole, 1972; Bernal, 1939, p. 411) , but by the 1960s and 1970s, this was changing and early on quantification became all important (de Solla Price, 1963) ; after all, quantification is assumed to be the hallmark of science, and the social and psychological sciences have always suffered from an inferiority complex regarding "subjectivity." What could be counted was good, and citations fit the bill precisely.
But science is simply far too complex to easily quantify and to attempt to do so leads to incorrect conclusions (Brumback, 2015) . Instead, we will have to descend to the lab bench and observe scientists at work. We must study papers and the influences on the people who write them. We must study the scientists themselves-not only their particular theoretical (paradigmatic) commitments but also their "social interests." Such an approach will not involve the "grand narratives and large-scale number crunching" (Cronin, 2005a, p. 1505) of former days but will be laborintensive and limited to small samples. In short, as Nader (1996) says: "science is not free of culture, rather, it is full of it" (p. xiii). This is not to say that quantitative methods may not be useful, but if they are used the data must be representative ("good data"), a point made long ago by Edge (1977) and one emphasized by all pollsters and statisticians (Wheelan, 2013) . In addition, because citation analysts rely on what today is called "big data," it cannot be emphasized enough that "a bigger sample will not make up for errors in its composition, or 'bias.' A bad sample is a bad sample. . .. In fact, a large, biased sample is arguably worse than a small, biased sample because it will give the false sense of confidence regarding the results" (Wheelan, 2013, p. 113) . This is precisely what has happened with citation analysis: the results are spurious because the sample is biased and "no amount of fancy statistical footwork will overcome basic inadequacies in either the appropriateness or the integrity of the data collected" (Goldstein-Spiegelhalter quoted by Adler, Ewing, and Taylor, 2009, p. 13 , emphasis in original; see also Wheelan, 2013, p. 111) . Proper data collection must rely on real knowledge of the subject, which few who use citations as evaluative data have (Smolinsky & Lercher, 2012) . A good example of this is the Garfield-Krell (2002) exchange over citation impact measures in taxonomy, a subject about which Garfield knew absolutely nothing. As Kostoff (2002) makes clear, "citation analysis requires technical experts performing very manually intensive comparisons with very subjective judgements" (p. 50). Not being statisticians, we have not been concerned with the problems inherent in the statistical handling of bibliometric data. However, some serious problems appear to exist, notably the statistical treatment behind the highly touted h, g, e, and m indices (see Adler et al., 2009, and comments; also Gingras, 2014) . As Abramo and D'Angelo (2016) say: "bibliometricians are now running out of alphabet and subscript characters to name all the new indicator varients" (p. 1751). Sosteric (1999) , referring to the work of Seglen (1992, p. 635) , says:
There have been purely statistical critiques that accuse citation analysis of providing nothing more than statistical artefacts reflective of the peculiarities of the academic population. The argument here is, given the nature of academic publication and the distribution of articles in the scholarly corpus, we'd simply expect, as a matter of course, a large number of publications would never be cited. It's a simple outcome of the distribution of publications and not reflective of ability at all. (p. 12, see also Seglen, 1997 Seglen, , 1998 Calver, 2013) .
Another point must be stressed. Because it is now widely recognized that peer review is not only time-consuming but highly fallible, many granting bodies and science administrators are relying more and more on citations in making evaluations-a dangerous reliance because, as we have repeatedly pointed out, scientists do not cite in ways that citation counts can be used as a proxy for impact or quality, and publishing is not the only way to contribute to science. Such measures lead to serious error, which may result in "science badly misusing the talent at its disposal" (Turner & Chubin, 1976, p. 657 ; see also Stephan, Veugelers, and Wang, 2017) .
But our point is not to argue that science badly misuses its talent-although this is undoubtedly true-but that the culture of citing and publishing is such that some whose work is used are acknowledged and some whose work is used are not acknowledged. Consequently, we do not need to ask whether or not science misuses its talent. Science is using its talent: it simply is not acknowledging most of it. In science, as in all hierarchical cultures, most individuals contribute but receive little or no credit. As Vilfredo Pareto pointed out years ago, the hog's share of virtually everything, including, apparently, scientific credit, goes to the few.
Therefore, we are left with no objective method to evaluate scientific impact, productivity, or quality, whether it be citation counts, peer review, publication counts, or any combination of these (but see Bornmann et al. 2014) . All are pervasively flawed; the flaws are so well known that one wonders why they have persisted as evaluative indicators for so long (Buschman & Michalek, 2013; Hutchinson, 2008; Moustafa, 2016) . Neither the "better than nothing," "the least worst," nor the "best of a bad lot" arguments are good enough. How odd it is that science, which prides itself on precision and numeration and which apparently can tell us exactly what was happening in the universe during the first yoctosecond after the Big Bang 14 billion years ago, cannot measure or describe itself accurately.
Postmortems on citation analysis are yet to be written. But they will all point to a phenomenon as old as human history, the so-called "Cassandra complex." Scientists, like everyone else, find it difficult to accept that which does not fit their beliefs, irrespective of the evidence.
